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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID J. OLSEN,

]

Plaintiff and Appellant, ]
vs.
MARILYN JOYCE OLSEN, aka
MARILYN JOYCE PERKINS,

Case No. 890676-CA

]I

Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the
above-entitled Court by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2) (h), U.C.A.,
1953 as amended.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff appeals from the order and judgment of the
Fifth District Court finding him in contempt and declaring that the
assets of a certain closely-held corporation were subject to
execution

in the enforcement of

a

judgment

rendered against

Plaintiff for child support arrearages.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was the "alter-ego" issue properly before the lower
court?
2. Is the judgment, to the extent it purports to effect
the assets of the closely-held corporation, void as against said
1

corporation?
3. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the finding
that the closely-held corporation is in fact Plaintiff's alter-ego?
4. Are the findings, taken as a whole, sufficient to
support the judgment of contempt?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The determination of this appeal does not require the
construction of the language of any constitutional provision,
statute or rule.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced April 24, 1987, in
bifurcated proceedings which reserved the issues of child support
and the division of property for trial at a later date (R. 77-83).
Prior to the divorce Plaintiff had been engaged in the
insurance business in St. George for approximately 15 years and,
through a corporation known as David J. Olsen & Associates, Inc.,
had built up Ma good insurance agency and a good business" (T. 7).
About six months after the entry of the decree dissolving the
marriage relationship, David J. Olsen & Associates contracted to
sell the insurance agency to one Robert MacLachlan (T. 7).
During the period intervening between the entry of the
Decree of Divorce and the trial on the issues of child support and
division of property, both Plaintiff and Defendant remarried (R.
82).
Trial on the issues of child support and division of
2

property

commenced

on

June

1,

1988, and

stipulation on June 3f 1988 (R. 54-66, 77-83).

concluded

with

a

Under the terms of

the stipulated decree, Plaintiff was awarded all the stock in David
J. Olsen & Associates, Inc., and was ordered to pay child support
in the amount of $190.00 per month, per child (R. 77-83).
MacLachlan failed to make the payment which fell due in
May 1988 and never made any further payment under the contract for
the purchase of the insurance agency (T. 7-8).
Litigation against MacLachlan was initiated in July 1988
and in mid-1989, David J. Olsen & Associates was awarded judgment
against MacLachlan in the amount of approximately $455,000.x

The

judgment is uncollectable (T. 8). In the course of the litigation
Plaintiff expended approximately $40,000 to $50,000 in attorney's
fees and costs in the attempt to enforce the contractual obligation
or recover the agency (T. 8).
Plaintiff

immediately

fell

into

default

in

the

performance of his child support obligations (R. 103-105; T. 8-9).
During the months of October and November 1988, Plaintiff
remained hopeful that he would be able to regain possession and
control of the insurance agency which, at that time, Plaintiff
believed MacLachlan was still operating.

Subsequent events would

establish that although the doors were open, MacLachlan was in fact
"out of business" and in January or February 1989 MacLachlan fired
all of his employees and closed the doors
1

(R. 9-10).

This case was styled David J. Olsen & Associates/ Inc., v. Great Basin
Insurance Brokers, Inc., and Robert MacLachlan et al.. Third Judicial District,
Salt Lake County, Civil No. C88-05346.

3

Plaintiff and his present wife then concluded, after
examining all of their options, that it would be best for them in
the short run and in the long run to go back into the insurance
business and to attempt to form an agency in Salt Lake County
(T.10) .
In April 1989, Defendant's counsel withdrew and in June,
Defendant initiated the proceedings which precipitated this appeal,
pro se (R. 198-207) .
Although the court's order and the proof of service
apparently never made their way into the court's file, it appears
that the Plaintiff was required to appear before the Domestic
Commissioner on July 26, 1989 and show cause why judgment should
not be entered against him for child support arrearages and why he
should not be punished for contempt (R. 208). Plaintiff appeared
by

and

through

his

former

counsel

but,

as

the

result

of

difficulties his present wife was experiencing with her pregnancy,
Plaintiff failed to appear in person.
At

that

hearing

counsel

conceded

that

Defendant's

calculation of the arrearage was correct and did not object to the
entry of judgment.

Counsel then requested that the issue of

contempt be continued.

The Commissioner continued the matter to

August 9, 1989, and ordered that Plaintiff be present and provide
the affidavit of his wife's physician excusing his absence from the
July 26 hearing (R. 208).
Plaintiff appeared with counsel on August 9 and the
subject hearing ensued.
4

Counsel stipulated to the entry of judgment for the child
support arrearages requested and the Commissioner identified the
only issues before the court as contempt for failure to pay support
as required by the decree and contempt for failure to appear on
July 26 (T. 3). Counsel advised the Commissioner that Plaintiff
was not prepared to provide the physician's affidavit conceding
that counsel had failed to contact Plaintiff and advise him of the
necessity of providing such an affidavit.

Counsel then asked the

Commissioner to allow Plaintiff to file the affidavit on or before
August 15 (T. 4-5).
affidavit

were

not

The Commissioner then stated that if the
filed

with

the

court

by August

15 the

Commissioner would recommend that the Plaintiff be punished for
contempt (T. 5 ) . 2
The Commissioner then took testimony regarding the issue
of the Plaintiff's contempt for failure to pay support as required
by the orders of the court.

Plaintiff commenced by outlining the

unanticipated difficulties which he had experienced with respect to
the sale of the St. George insurance agency and his attempt to
establish a new agency in Salt Lake County (R. 7-10).
Plaintiff

testified

that

as

a

result

of

these

unanticipated difficulties the only income he could count on on a
monthly basis was "roughly between $800.00 and $1,000.00 per month"
(T. 11).

2
The Affidavit of Dr. E. K. Rasmussen dated and sworn on August 10/ 1989,
was not filed with the Court until August 22, 1989, following the entry of the
Commissioner's Memorandum Decision which was date stamped earlier the same day
(R. 216-224).
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Plaintiff testified that the business of the new agency
was beginning to pick up but that it would probably be at least a
year before it would generate "a decent income or anything that
I've

been used

to in the past of

Plaintiff

testified

getting"

(T. 11-12, 14).

that he had provided

$1,000 in

support during the preceding three months and that he was prepared
to pay another $150 on the date of the hearing (T. 13).
During

cross-examination

of

the

Plaintiff,

the

Commissioner asked the Defendant to describe "how this DJO and
Associates worked when you were married"

(T. 39).

Defendant

responded by saying that DJO and Associates was just a "front,"
"just a way of getting the cars for everybody" (T. 39).

The

Defendant stated under further questioning by the Commissioner that
David J. Olsen & Associates had several employees, including one
Gary Jackson and Jackson's brother-in-law.

"There were three or

four salesman there" (T. 39).
Plaintiff's former counsel then questioned the Defendant
during cross-examination of the Plaintiff:
MR.
SNOW: Getting
back
to
DJO, it's my
understanding that DJO was an operating corporation
that was involved in both the insurance business
and I guess in the photo — photo processing
business?
MS. PERKINS: Right.
MR. SNOW:

But --

MS. PERKINS: All of David's business dealings were
done through DJO & Associates.
MR. SNOW: Okay. And that was while he was in St.
George here; isn't that right?
6

MS. PERKINS:

It was while we were married.

MR. SNOW: Okay. While you were married. But what
I — the point I'm making is they were actually
operating business entities that included other
people other than David Olsen; isn't that correct?
MS. PERKINS: I believe so. David was the only one
that could draw the money from —
from DJO &
Associates. He was the one that signed all the
checks; he was the one that was the overseer of it
all.
MR SNOW: But what I'm saying is the only monies
that came out of DJO didn't just solely go to
automobiles, but they also paid other people's
salaries like Gary Jackson; isn't that correct?
MS. PERKINS: I don't know. I — I wasn't aware of
it. All I know is that I was the vice president or
something on that, and it was just a front.
What I understand is that a corporation is supposed
to hold business meetings regularly. There was no
business meeting ever held. It was — it was a
front is all it was — it was and ever will be.
Just the way that — it's supposed — the way he
explained it to me when we first got it started was
that it would — it — I don't see that it's —
(T. 42-44)
On r e d i r e c t examination P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t David J.
Olsen & A s s o c i a t e s was i n f a c t a funded corporation and various
b u s i n e s s e s were conducted through t h i s corporate form including
Olsen-Jackson Insurance Agency and J i f f y Photo (T. 4 4 - 4 5 ) .
During
questioned

the

course

of

the

about DKO Insurance Agency. 3

hearing,
This

Plaintiff
evidence

was

can be

f a i r l y summarized as f o l l o w s :

3
DKO Investments, I n c . , i s a Utah corporation which does b u s i n e s s as DKO
Insurance Agency.
The testimony at t h e August 9 hearing referred t o the
corporation by i t s assumed name. That manner of reference i s continued in t h i s
b r i e f for the sake of c l a r i t y .
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1. DKO Insurance Agency is a corporation whose principal
officers include Plaintiff's present wife, president; his brotherin-law, Gordon Denison, vice-president; and Plaintiff who acts as
secretary/treasurer (T. 40).
2. DKO Insurance Agency has been capitalized by means of
loans made to Plaintiff or his present wifef the proceeds of which
have been placed in the corporation (T. 45-46).
3. DKO Insurance Agency is the entity through which the
Plaintiff is attempting to establish a new insurance agency in Salt
Lake County (T. 31).
4. This corporation employs Plaintiff's present wife and
her salary is established at $2,600.00 per month, however she does
not always draw that amount because there are not always sufficient
funds available to pay her salary.

The funds that have been paid

her thus far are in fact loan proceeds (T. 22-23, 30-31, 46).
5. DKO Insurance Agency owns a 1986 Chevrolet Camero and
a 1988 Chevrolet pickup truck of which Plaintiff and his present
wife have possession and use (T. 32).
6. Plaintiff draws no salary from DKO Insurance Agency
and his compensation

in the

insurance business

is generated

strictly through the earning and payment of commissions (T. 23).
Following the hearing, the Commissioner found that the
Plaintiff had been "voluntarily unemployed" and David J. Olsen &
Associates was maintained as a "holding" corporation "for receipt
of funds and disbursal of same for family necessities and living
expenses such as automobiles, boats, airplanes and motorhomes" (R.
8

219) . The Commissioner concluded that DKO Insurance Agency was the
Plaintiff's alter ego established to "insulate Plaintiff's assets
from creditors, including Defendant's claim for past, present and
future child support and to provide Plaintiff with a secure and
comfortable lifestyle while he maintains that he has no income." *
* * "Defendant's husband has recourse against Plaintiff and or his
corporation for monies expended by him for support of Plaintiff's
children" (R. 221).
The Commissioner's Memorandum Decision was filed on
August 22 and Plaintiff's counsel withdrew on August 23 (R. 216222f 225-226).
On

September

18

the

Commissioner

signed

an

order

adjudging the Plaintiff guilty of contempt for failure to provide
support and for failure to appear at the July 26 hearing.
Order further declares:
3. The income of Plaintiff's current spouse is
money available to Plaintiff to support his
children. The Defendant's husband is entitled to
recourse against Plaintiff and/or his corporation
for monies expended by Defendant's husband for the
support of Plaintiff's children.
•

*

*

5. The assets of DKO Insurance Company, Inc., and
alter ego of Plaintiff established to insulate his
assets from creditors, including Defendant's claim
for past, present and future child support, are
hereby ordered subject to action by Defendant to
satisfy outstanding judgments she has or may have
against the Plaintiff. The Defendant may execute
against the assets of said corporation directly in
order to collect Judgments she has or may have
against Plaintiff.
T. 233-234.
9

The

On September 27, 1989, Plaintiff's present counsel filed
his appearance and, on the same day, filed written objections to
the Commissioner's findings together with a motion for a new trial
(R. 235-241)•
On October 11f 1989, the district court overruled the
objections as untimely, not having been filed within 10 days of the
filing of the Commissioner's Memorandum Decision, and denied the
motion for new trial (R. 244). This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the outset of the hearing, the issues were narrowly
defined and did not include a question of whether or not DKO
Insurance

Company

was

in

fact

Plaintiff's

alter

ego.

The

conclusion that the corporation was Plaintiff's alter ego is
unsupported by the evidence.

The judgment entered pursuant to

those conclusions is not binding upon DKO Insurance Agency because
it is not a party to these proceedings.
Finally, the evidence, taken as a whole, does not support
the judgment of contempt.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE "ALTER EGO" ISSUE WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER.
At the outset of the hearing the matter at issue was
narrowly defined as one of contempt for the Plaintiff's alleged
willful failure to provide support for his children.

While under

Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, issues not raised by the
10

pleadings may be tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties, it is apparent from the record that the "alter egoM issue
was raised principally as the result of questions exchanged between
the Commissioner and the Defendant while the Defendant was "crossexamining" the Plaintiff.
The test for determining whether the pleadings should be
deemed amended under Rule 15(b) is "whether the opposing party had
a fair opportunity to defend and whether it could offer additional
evidence if the case were retried on a different theory."

R. A.

Pohl Const. Co. v. Marshall, 640 F.2d 266 267 (10th Cir.1981).
Clearly, had Plaintiff been aware that the viability and
bona fides of David J. Olsen & Associates and DKO Insurance Agency
were issues in this proceeding, Plaintiff's position in defending
the

allegations

of

alter

ego would

have been

significantly

enhanced.

As it was, Plaintiff was left to defend against

conclusory

allegations

without

the

availability

of

a

single

corporate document or record to assist him.
POINT II
THE JUDGMENT
AGENCY.

IS VOID AS AGAINST DKO

INSURANCE

The judgment of the district court purports to give the
Defendant and her present husband authority to execute any judgment
against the Plaintiff by seizing and selling assets belonging to
DKO Insurance Agency.
distinct

legal

entity.

DKO Insurance Agency is a separate and
Neither

the

corporation

shareholders were made parties to these proceedings.
11

nor

its

In the typical case, the "alter ego" doctrine is used to
get through the corporation and reach assets of the shareholders.
In such a situationf the liability of the individual stockholder is
never determined in a proceeding in which only the corporation is
named as a party.

The corporate entity and the shareholder sought

to be charged are both joined and afforded an opportunity to
defend.
The instant case takes somewhat of a back door approach
rendering a judgment which purports to bind upon the corporation
which is not even a party to the proceedings.

Clearly this

judgment cannot bind the corporation without resulting in the
denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I,
Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
COMMISSIONER'S FINDING THAT DKO INSURANCE AGENCY IS
IN FACT THE PLAINTIFF'S ALTER EGO.
Ordinarily a corporation is viewed as a legal entity
distinct from its shareholders.

Under the equitable "alter ego"

doctrine, courts have, upon a proper showing, disregarded the
integrity of the corporation and viewed a controlling shareholder
as indistinguishable from the corporation, permitting creditors of
the corporation to reach assets of the controlling shareholder.
See Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (1973).
certain

instances, the

doctrine

has

been

applied

In

to permit

creditors of the individual stockholder to reach assets of the
12

corporation where the requirements of the doctrine are satisfied.
See Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power and Water, 129 Utah
Adv.Rep- 13 (March 6, 1990) (dictum); Cf. Colman v. Colman, 743
P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987).
Before the equitable doctrine may be invoked there must
be a concurrence of two circumstances:

(1) There must be such a

unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of
the corporation and the individual no longer exist; and (2) the
observance of the corporation form would sanction a fraud, promote
injustice, or an inequitable result would follow. Norman v. Murray
First Thrift and Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979).
In Colman, supra. the Court of Appeals affirmed a decree
which pierced and disregarded the veil of the defendant husband's
corporations.

In that case the assets held by the corporations

were substantial as was the evidence demonstrating a unity of
interest and ownership between the defendant and his corporation.
In the instant case, the Commissioner apparently assumed
that

conclusory

statements

made

regarding

David

J.

Olsen &

Associates had some probative value in reaching her conclusion that
the existence of DKO Insurance Agency should be disregarded.
Otherwise, it would have been pointless for her to have made
findings regarding the operation of that corporation.
The evidence regarding the operation of David J. Olsen &
Associates is clearly insufficient to support the invocation of the
"alter ego" doctrine.

This was a corporation which had several

employees, maintained a viable insurance agency, established a
13

photo processing lab, and accumulated hundreds of thousands of
dollars in assets.
The evidence is insufficient to establish a unity of
interest and ownership between Plaintiff and DKO Insurance Agency
and even if such a unity existed, the second prong of the test
remains completely unsatisfied.

There is no evidence that DKO

Insurance Agency has been used as a vehicle for accumulating assets
which the Plaintiff has attempted to shield from this Defendant or
any

other

creditor.

Indeed

the

only

two

corporate

assets

identified in the record are a 1986 automobile and a 1988 pickup
truck.

Furthermore, the record does not indicate what, if any,

equity the corporation actually has in these two assets.
In reversing a summary judgment which disregarded the
existence of a defendant corporation, the Utah Supreme Court
recently said:
We have also said, "[t]he [alter ego] test's second
prong is addressed to the conscience of the court,
and the circumstances under which it will be met
will vary with each case." Messick, 678 P.2d at
794. However, that does not mean that a court has
carte blanche to refuse to recognize the legal
separation of shareholder and corporation.
The
second prong of the test is not met simply because
a trial court finds that that form would in some
way prevent a creditor of a controlling shareholder
from quickly being made whole.
The inequity
contemplated by the second requirement of the alter
ego test is not present just because the existence
of the corporate form is inconvenient for a
creditor seeking to pursue the shareholder's
assets; it is not enough for the creditor to
complain that it must proceed against the
shareholder's assets, including the stock in the
corporation, rather than simply levying on the
corporation's assets. To find that "observance of
the corporate form would sanction a fraud [and]
promote injustice[] or an inequitable result would
14

follow," it must be shown that the corporation
itself played a role in the inequitable conduct at
issue. [citations omitted]
Transamerica Case Reserve v. Dixie Power and Water, supra, 129 Utah
Adv.Rep. at 14.
It is difficult

to

see how the

avoidance

of this

corporate entity will promote justice where it is apparent that the
corporation is not a repository of assets which would otherwise be
available for the execution of judgment against the Plaintiff.
Furthermore, the evidence does not demonstrate that the
corporate entity has been used as a vehicle for diverting income
away from the Plaintiff and consequently his creditors.

The

testimony was unrebutted but the funds which have been available
for the payment of Plaintiff's present wife's salary were in fact
borrowed by the Plaintiff and/or his wife.
The evidence indicates that the unavailability of the
funds necessary to meet the Plaintiff's support obligation is in
fact the result of catastrophic financial reversals precipitated by
the breach of the MacLachlan contract rather than the result of
some clever manipulation of DKO Insurance Agency or its assets.
If the judgment stands, the specter of possible future
applications

of

the

principals

of

collateral

estoppel

may

effectively cripple the corporation through which the Plaintiff is
attempting to re-establish his livelihood in the insurance industry
without affording the Defendant any appreciable relief.

15

POINT IV
THE FINDINGS WHICH ARE IN FACT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT.
The Commissioner's finding that the Plaintiff "has been
voluntarily unemployed" is not supported by the evidence. Clearly
the Plaintiff's, as well as the Defendant's, long-term interests
are best served by the development of the insurance agency which
Plaintiff has initiated

in Salt Lake County.

Plaintiff could take a

"full-time job" which may immediately

generate more income than he is currently earning.

Obviously the

Nevertheless,

the unrebutted evidence indicates that the course of action which
the Plaintiff has selected will better serve the parties' long-term
interests.
The Commissioner's findings regarding the payment of
medical expenses are on their face insufficient to support a
judgment of contempt.

Under the existing

court orders the

Plaintiff is responsible to provide health insurance for the minor
children and to pay any medical expenses incurred by the children
during the period of approximately three months when Plaintiff did
not maintain a policy of health insurance (R. 194-197).
Plaintiff in fact maintains health insurance on the
children and the Defendant has failed to identify any obligation
which was incurred during the period of time when Plaintiff had
allowed the insurance coverage to lapse (T. 32-35).
The Commissioner's

findings regarding the fact that

Plaintiff has not attempted to invade the corpus of the trust in
16

which he possesses a beneficial
judgment of contempt.

interest will not support a

The evidence was uncontradicted that the

Plaintiff is merely a beneficiary of the trust, the trust is
administered by First Security Bank, the Plaintiff has no power to
invade the trust, the trust was created and/or administered during
the marriage between the parties and the Plaintiff has never
invaded the corpus of the trust for any reason (T.27-29).
Whether or not the Defendant or the minor children may
themselves be able to reach the Plaintiff's trust income is another
issue.

See Comment b, Restatement 2d, Trusts §157 (1959).

The

fact that the Plaintiff has not attempted to break or invade a
spendthrift trust created by his grandfather is certainly not
evidence of contempt.
The Commissioner's

findings regarding the "luxurious

home" and the "26-foot houseboat" which Plaintiff identified as his
wife's property are not supported by evidence sufficient to sustain
a judgment of contempt.

These "revelations" were obviously a

source of some aggravation to the Commissioner as well as the
Defendant. However, the record is devoid of any evidence regarding
the acquisition of these properties, the existence of any equity
therein, the payment status of any concomitant obligation or the
feasibility

of

restructuring

or

avoiding

these

obligations

following the financial reversals suffered by the Plaintiff.
Finally, the Commissioner makes certain findings and
reaches certain conclusions related to Plaintiff's present wife's
income.

Plaintiff

testified
17

his

wife's

compensation

was

established at $2,600 per month. The evidence was also unrebutted
that funds were not always available for the payment of the agreed
salary and that what funds were available were actually loan
proceeds.

The Commissioner's legal conclusion that Plaintiff's

present wife owes these children some legal duty of support, under
the facts of this case, sheds little light on the issue of the
Plaintiff's contempt.
At

the

outset

of

the

contempt

proceedings

the

Commissioner stated that the burden of proof would rest upon the
Plaintiff (R. 5 ) . See Hillyard v. District Court of Cache County,
68 Utah 220, 249 P.806 (1926); De Yonoe v. De Yonqe, 103 Utah 410,
135 P.2d 905 (1943).
The Commissioner apparently concluded that the Plaintiff
had failed to carry his burden and, while not imposing any jail
sentence, the Commissioner did impose two fines in the amount of
$100 each, neither of which could be purged by future compliance
with any court order.

These proceedings should therefore be

considered criminal, rather than civil, in nature.

Cf. Snow v.

Snow, 13 Utah 15, 43 P. 620 (1896); Hillyard v. District Court of
Cache County, supra.
In Snow v. Snow, supra, the appellant was adjudged guilty
of contempt for his refusal and neglect to pay alimony "and was
given 30 days time in which to purge himself of the contempt."

13

Utah at 17. The opinion notes a distinction between that class of
contempt

proceedings

which

are

brought

for

the

purpose

of

vindicating the authority and dignity of the court and contempt
18

proceedings which are remedial in nature and initiated for the
purpose of enforcing a remedy for the benefit or advantage of the
opposing party.

The court concluded that the proceedings were

civil in nature because the appellant could avoid punishment by
compliance with previous court orders.
In Hillyard v. District Court of Cache County, supra, the
petitioner had been ordered "to pay to his former wife the sum of
$100.00" and was remanded to the custody of the sheriff and
committed to jail "until such payment was made."

68 Utah at 222.

The Utah Supreme Court concluded that this too was a civil
proceeding, citing Snow v. Snow, supra.
In the instant case the Plaintiff was ordered to pay
fines amounting to $200.

No method was provided for purging the

contempt, nor was the payment to be made for the benefit of the
opposing party.

This punishment was imposed for the purpose of

vindicating the authority and dignity of the court.
Under these circumstances, while the burden of going
forward with the evidence may have properly been imposed upon the
Plaintiff, the ultimate burden of proof should have been placed
upon the moving party.

See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. — , 108 S.Ct.

--, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988).
With the appropriate distribution of the burdens of proof
in mind, the insufficiency

of the evidence

is more clearly

demonstrated.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence does not
19

support the judgments of contempt and the judgment entered in the
trial court should be reversed to that extent.

Furthermore, even

if this Court is inclined to affirm the findings of contempt, the
findings and conclusions relating to DKO Insurance Agency should be
stricken so as to deprive them of any application by way of
collateral estoppel in future proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of April, 1990.

M.
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this 5th day of April, 1990,
I did personally mail four true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing document to Marilyn Joyce Perkins at P. 0. Box 1532,
Overton, Nevada 89040.

AS/
Gary W. Pendleton
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID J. OLSEN,
Plaintiff,

)
)>

vs.

)

MARILYN JOYCE OLSEN,
nka MARILYN JOYCE PERKINS,

]>

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Civil No. 87-1303

Defendant.

This matter came on for continued hearing on Defendant's
Order to Show Cause on the 9th day of August, 1989 before Marlynn B.
Lema, Domestic Commissioner, and Plaintiff was personally present in
Court and represented by counsel, V. Lowry Snow and Defendant appeared
pro se and the Court having heard testimony and having received
evidence and being fully advised in the premises, having taken the
matter under advisement, hereby renders its Memorandum Decision:

CASE HISTORY
1.

That the parties were divorced April 24, 1987 in a

bifurcated proceeding with Decree of Property Division and Child
Support having been entered on July 8, 1988 based upon stipulation of
the parties..
2.

That pursuant to said stipulation and decree, Plaintiff

agreed and was ordered to pay the sum of $190.00 per month per child
as and for child support for each of the six minor children of the
parties.
3.

That Plaintiff paid no child support for the months of

July, August and September, 1988 resulting in Defendant's filing a
Motion for Order to Show Cause to be heard on October 18, 1988.
4.

That said hearing was continued by written stipulation of

the parties to November 1, 1988.
5.

A hearing was held on November 1, 1988 and Plaintiff

failed to appear.

A recommendation of contempt of court was entered

for his failure to appear.
6.

Plaintiff had paid no child support for the period of

July through October, 1988.

Judgment was entered in favor of

Defendant in the amount of $4,560.00.
7.

Plaintiff filed his objection to the recommendation of

the Commissioner and during the pendency of said proceeding and on
December 21, 1988 the parties stipulated yet again.
had been paid for November or December.

No child support

Pursuant to said stipulation

the hearing set for that day was continued and Plaintiff paid the
support obligation for November and December, 1988 and agreed to pay
obligation for January, 1989 before January 15.

2
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8.

At a hearing before Judge J. Philip Eves on March 14,

1989/ the parties once again stipulated.

(No child support had been

paid for January, February or March, 1989.)

Plaintiff agreed to pay

and paid child support obligation for January, February and March; to
keep his child support current and to pay an additional sum of $200.00
per month toward reduction of the outstanding judgment against him.
9.

That subsequent to said stipulation and corresponding

Order of the Court, Plaintiff has made only partial payment of child
support owing $1,680.00 for the months of May and June, $1,140.00 for
the month of July with an additional $1,140.00 due and payable on the
15th of August.

In addition, Plaintiff has not made any of the agreed

upon $200.00 per month installments on the oustanding judgment.
10.

On July 14, 1989, Defendant filed her Motion for Order

to Show Cause and hearing was set for July 26, 1989.

At the time set

for said hearing, Defendant appeared and Plaintiff did not appear.
Counsel for Plaintiff represented to the Court that Plaintiff's wife
was pregnant requiring his presence to care for her and agreed that
judgment should enter in the amount set out in the Motion plus the
amount owing for the month of July.

Plaintiff was ordered to appear

on the issue of contempt on the 9th of August with medical
documentation of the necessity of his absence at the July 26th hearing.
11.

At the hearing on August 9, Plaintiff appeared with

counsel and defendant appeared pro se.

The Court reserved the issue

of contempt to August 15 to allow Plaintiff additional time to secure
the medical documentation ordered at the prior hearing.

Plaintiff

failed to provide said documentation.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That since the divorce of the parties in 1987, Plaintiff

has been voluntarily unemployed, subsisting on Trust benefits and
other unidentified resources.

That Plaintiff and his current spouse

have, since the divorce, maintained a very comfortable lifestyle for
themselves.
2.

That Plaintiff has paid support for his six minor

children only when faced with imminent judicial proceedings and/or
sanctions.
3.

That prior to the divorce of the parties, Plaintiff

maintained a corporation described as a "holding" corporation for
receipt of funds and disbursal of same for family necessities and
living expenses such as automobiles, boats, airplanes and motorhomes.
That this corporation was partially funded by Plaintiff's father.
This corporation was identified as DJO and Associates.
4.

That in February, 1989, Plaintiff formed another closely

held corporation (DKO Insurance Agency, Inc.) and is reestablishing an
insurance business in the Salt Lake area.
is in Plaintiff's

home.

The office for the agency

Plaintiff is the insurance agent.

Plaintiff's present wife is the bookkeeper for said agency and
President of the corporation.

For these services, the corporation

pays her $2,600.00 per month.

Plaintiff is paid nothing for his

services.

The current Mrs. Olsen's brother is Vice-President of the

corporation and Plaintiff is the secretary.

The Corporation owns a

1986 Camaro (Iroc) and a 1988 pick-up truck and pays the insurance on
same.

Plaintiff and his wife use these vehicles as their own.

That

capitalization for said corporation was acquired from "loans" secured
by notes owed to Plaintiff.

5.

Plaintiff and his wife enjoy the comfort of a large,

luxurious home which Plaintiff says is the sole property of his wife.
In addition, they have a 26-foot houseboat also (it is alleged) the
sole property of Plaintiff's wife.
6.

That Plaintiff receives monthly dividends from a Trust

fund (valued at approximately $200,000) in amounts varying between
$400 and $1,500 per month.

That Plaintiff has not requested advances

on said Trust in order that he may support his minor children.

That

the trust will mature in the 1990*s.
7.

That Defendant lives with her current husband, her six

children and a foster child in a mobile home in Overton, Nevada.
Defendant does not work, is not trained to work and has children
between the ages of 3 and 17 in her care.
8.

That Plaintiff was ordered to provide medical insurance

for his minor children, but that for a period of time subsequent to
the divorce he did not do so.

In the stipulation of March 14, 1989,

Plaintiff agreed to pay any and all medical expenses for said children
incurred during the period when they were uninsured.
9.

That medical bills have been sent to Plaintiff by the

health care providers in the approximate amount of $500.00 which
Plaintiff has refused to pay; indicating to the Court that since he is
not the custodial parent he has no legal obligation to pay said
bills.

(See also Defendant's Exhibit #1.)
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes

as follows:

nnnoon

1.

That DKO Insurance Agency, Inc. is the alter ego of

Plaintiff established to, among other things, insulate Plaintiffs
assets from creditors, including Defendant's claim for past, present
and future child support and to provide Plaintiff with a secure and
comfortable lifestyle while he maintains that he has no income.

Such

activity promotes severe injustice to Plaintiff's children and
constitutes fraud.

(see Colman vs. Colman, 743 P.2d 782.)

That the

assets of said corporation are subject to action which defendant may
bring to satisfy outstanding judgments she may have against Plaintiff.
2.

That Plaintiff has willfully refused to pay child support

although he has repeatedly agreed to do so and has agreed to the
amount of said support through numerous stipulations which he has
failed to honor.

For that willful refusal to pay Court ordered child

support, Plaintiff should be held in contempt of this Court and should
pay a fine of $100.00.
3.

That pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-4.1 a step-parent has a

duty to support step-children and, therefore, the $2,600.00 salary of
Plaintiff's current wife is considered funds available to Plaintiff to
support his children.

Defendant's husband has recourse against

Plaintiff and/or his corporation for monies expended by him for the
support of Plaintiff's children.
4.

That Defendant should be awarded judgment as against

Plaintiff in the amount of $3,960.00 for the months of June, July and
August, 1989 and is entitled to recover costs incurred in the bringing
of this action plus expenses incurred in the bringing of this action
and for attendance at two hearings.

£
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5.

Plaintiff is in contempt of this Court for his failure to

appear at hearing on July 26, 1989 and for his failure to furnish
documentation to support his excuse that it was necessary for him to
care for his pregnant wife.

Plaintiff should be held in contempt of

this Court and should pay an additional fine of $100.00.
Defendant is directed to submit to the Court within 10 days
an affidavit of costs and expenses as set forth above.
Defendant is further directed to prepare an Order on Order to
Show Cause commensurate with this decision.
Dated this

%/^

day of August, 1989.

MAtfLYNN B^ftMA
Domestic i^ommissioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

nd_

I hereby certify that on the
day of August, 1989,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION
to the following:

V. Lowry Snow
P. O. Box 2747
St. George, UT

84771-2747

Marilyn Joyce Perkins
P. O. Box 1532
Overton, NV 89040

David J. Olsen
1923 Sunny Glen Circle
Sandy, UT 84093

Ut

C^

Deputy Clerk
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Marilyn Perkins Pro Se
P.O. Box 1532
Overton, Nevada 8904 0
(702) 397-2185

DEPUTY.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID J. OLSEN,

^^^sr^e^
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE,
ORDER IN RE: CONTEMPT AND
JUDGMENT

VS.

MARILYN JOYCE OLSEN, a/k/a/
MARILYN JOYCE PERKINS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 87-1303

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for continued
hearing on Defendant's Order to Show Cause on the 9th day of August,
1989, before Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Commissioner.

The Plaintiff

was personally present in Court and represented by his counsel of
record, V. Lowry Snow.

The Defendant appeared pro se.

heard testimony and received evidence.

The Court

After being fully advised in

the premises, and having taken the matter under advisement, the
Court issued its Memorandum Decision on or about August 21, 1989.
Pursuant to that Memorandum Decision and the Order of this
Court dated September 6, 1989, signed by Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic
Commissioner,

it

is

hereby

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED,

and

DECREED

as

follows:
1.

The Defendant is awarded judgment against the Plaintiff in

the amount of $3,960.00 for delinquent child support for the months
M14/8

m
of Juire, July and August, 1989, together with her costs in the
amount of $ JT %g.

, for a total judgment of $ ¥t

¥Q.

' , said

judgment to accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum as provided
by law.
2.

For his willful refusal to pay court ordered child support,

the Plaintiff is hereby found in contempt and is ordered to pay a
fine of $100.00.
3.

The income of Plaintiff's current wife is money available

to Plaintiff to support his children.

The Defendant's husband is

entitled to recourse against Plaintiff and/or his corporation for
monies

expended

by

Defendant's

husband

for

the

support

of

Plaintiff's children.
4.

For Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing on July

26, 1989, and his failure to furnish documentation to support his
excuse that it was necessary for him to be absent in order to care
for his pregnant wife, the Plaintiff is hereby found in contempt of
court and is ordered to pay an additional fine of $100.00.
5.

The assets of DKO Insurance Company, Inc., an alter ego of

Plaintiff

established

including

Defendant's

support, are hereby
satisfy

outstanding

Plaintiff.

to

insolate

claim

his

assets

for past, present

ordered
judgments

subject

from
and

creditors,

future child

to action by Defendant to

she has or may

have

against the

The Defendant may execute against the assets of said

corporation directly in order to collect judgments she has or may

have against Plaintiff.
DATED this

£ ^°

day of v ^ ^ ^ ^ l ,

1989.

BY THE COURT:

Marlynn^. Lema
-^ ^ X
Domestic Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct cppy of the
above and foregoing document, postage pre-paid on the /4?
day of
,X j-f"
, to David J. Olsen, 1923 Sunny Glen Circle, Sandy,
Utah'^84093.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

VIRGINIA M. Corbitt,
Petitioner,

i

Case No. 890674-CA

i

Category No. 14a

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,
Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition for review of a formal adjudicative
proceeding.

Jurisdiction to hear this petition is vested in the

Court of Appeals by Utah Code Ann. §§

63-46b-16, 78-2a-3(2)(a).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Virginia M. Corbitt seeks review of a final decision of the
Director of the Utah Department of Health (DOH), Division of Health
Care Financing (DHCF), which affirmed in part and reversed in part
a hearing officer's decision.

The hearing officer found that

Corbitt's first application for Medicaid was properly denied for
failure to provide necessary verification of eligibility.

The

Director affirmed this holding. The hearing officer further found
petitioner eligible for Medicaid on a second application, holding
that a transfer on February 23, 1989
1

of certain assets was not

done

in contemplation

of

an application

for benefits

under

Medicaid. The hearing officer's order was reviewed by the Director
of DHCF who affirmed the hearing officer as to the first ruling,
but reversed the second ruling, finding that the transfer of assets
violated the agency's policies and procedures, thereby making
petitioner ineligible for Medicaid.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the Director of DHCF erroneously interpreted or

applied the law in finding that petitioner's first application was
properly denied for a lack of verification?
2.

Whether the Director of DHCF erroneously interpreted or

applied the law in finding that the transfer of certain assets on
February 23, 1989 was done in order to qualify for Medicaid,
thereby disqualifying petitioner from receiving benefits?
3. Whether the Director of DHCF was illegally constituted as
a decision-making body or was subject to disqualification because
of his interest in the financial matters of the Utah Medicaid
program?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
42 U.S.C. S 1396a et seq.
42 U.S.C. S 1396p(2) (c)(2)
(1988)

42 C.F.R. S 435.911
Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM S 565-2
2.B. (7-89)
Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 565-3
2. (11-89)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Administrative

Procedures Act provides that an

appellate court may grant relief if it determines that a person
2

seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's
erroneous interpretation or application of the law. Utah Code Ann.
S 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988).

The Supreme Court has held that the

correction-of-error standard applies to agency rulings on issues
of law and extends no deference to them.
Comm'n., 767 P.2d

524, 527

Hurley v. Industrial

(Utah 1988).

Concerning

issues

involving mixed law and fact, an agency decision deserves some
deference and will not be set aside unless it is unreasonable. Id.
However, the deference given an agency in its area of expertise is
not so expansive as to require a sanctioning of the agency's
misinterpretation of its own statute and related rules.

Boyd v.

Dep't. of Empl. S e c , 773 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the case
This is a request for review by the Court of Appeals of a

final agency decision denying Virginia Corbitt Medicaid benefits.
Corbitt requested a hearing, following denial of benefits on two
applications for Medicaid benefits. The hearing officer found that
Corbitt's initial application had been properly denied, since she
had not supplied the necessary verification.

He found that the

denial of Corbitt's second application was improper, since property
transferred by her prior to filing for Medicaid was done for
purposes other than to qualify for Medicaid. The Director of DHCF
reviewed the hearing officer's decision and affirmed the denial of
the first application but reversed the second finding.
seeks reversal of the Director's

Corbitt

decision and a declaration that
3

she has been eligible for Medicaid since the date of her original
application.
b.

Course of Proceedings
Corbitt filed her first application for benefits on March 16,

1989.

(Transcript of Hearing ("TH") 24) It was denied May 11,

1989 for the reason that the necessary verification to determine
eligibility was not provided. (Clerk's Notation of Record ("NR")
53) Corbitt requested a hearing which was held September 12, 1989
before Hearing Officer Cornelius Hyzer. (TH 2) The day prior to
the hearing, Corbitt had filed a second application for Medicaid
which was denied September 12, 1989 for the reason given that
Corbitt had transferred her share in property held jointly with
her son, Whitney Corbitt, on February 23, 1989 at less than fair
market value and for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. (NR
56) On September 20, 1989, the hearing officer affirmed the first
denial but reversed the second, finding that Corbitt had not
transferred property in order to qualify for Medicaid. (NR 28) The
Director of the Medicaid agency reviewed the formal order and, in
an order on review issued October 20, 1989, affirmed the first
finding, but reversed the second. (NR 21)

Corbitt filed her

petition for writ of review on November 20, 1989. (NR 9)
c.

Disposition at the Medicaid Agency
The final agency action denied Corbitt Medicaid on both of her

applications. The final result of the agency's action is that she
will remain ineligible for Medicaid up to 30 months from the date
of transfer. (TH 51-52)
4

d.

Relevant Facts
Virginia Corbitt is an eighty-one-year-old woman who until

June 1986 resided with her son, Whitney Corbitt, at a home owned
jointly with him. (TH 48).

At that time, Corbitt left the family

home and moved to a retirement center. (TH 48)

On September 12,

1986, she deeded one-half of the home to her son by a quit claim
deed. (NR 47)

Corbitt remained in the retirement home until

February 13, 1989 when she fell and was taken to St. Mark's
Hospital. (TH 46-47)

She remained in the hospital until February

23, 1989 when she was transferred to Care West Nursing Home in Salt
Lake City.

(TH 46)

Prior to leaving the hospital, Corbitt signed a quit claim
deed conveying the other half interest in the home to her son,
Whitney Corbitt. (TH 46, NR 51)

She also signed a durable power

of attorney, appointing her son, Whitney Corbitt, as her attorney
in fact. (NR 49)
At the time Corbitt was placed at Care West Nursing Home, she
was receiving Medicare benefits which paid for her hospitalization
and initial nursing home stay. (NR 73)

On March 16, 1989,

following expiration of her Medicare eligibility, Corbitt's son
applied for Medicaid benefits on behalf of his mother. (TH 24)
Whitney Corbitt obtained the Medicaid application from Christine
DeBlasio,

a

social

worker

at

Care

West.

(TH

4)

Certain

verification was needed for approval of the application, which
Whitney Corbitt attempted to obtain. (TH 18-20)

The requested

verification was not supplied and the application was denied on May
5

11, 1989. (NR 53)

A hearing was requested and held on September

127 1989 before Hearing Officer Cornelius Hyzer. (TH 2)

The day

before the hearing, Whitney Corbitt submitted a second application
for Medicaid which was denied September 12, 1989. (NR 56)

The

reason given for the denial was that the applicant had transferred
a share of her home in February 1989 without receiving fair market
value and for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. (NR 56)
Corbitt was advised that the sanction period for the denial would
be the lesser of thirty months or the fair market value of the
property transferred divided by $1,530.00. (NR56)
At the hearing, Whitney Corbitt appeared and testified that
the verification required to complete the first application was
delayed, because he had had difficulty obtaining documentation from
his attorney. (TH 31) He testified that Virginia Corbitt conveyed
the half interest in the home to him on February 23/ 1989 on the
advice of his attorney. (TH 44) He testified his mother was in the
hospital at the time and that the transfer needed to be done, but
was not done to hide assets in order to qualify for Medicaid. (TH
44) The transfer was donef according to Whitney Corbitt/ to avoid
the possibility of his mother becoming incapable of signing over
the title to him. (TH 44)

He testified that the previous half

interest was transferred to him in 1986 on the advice of his
attorney

in order to protect the property during a divorce

proceeding. (TH 44)

He testified that in February 1989/ the

divorce was final and it seemed to be a good time in which to
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transfer the other half# since his ex-wife no longer had a claim.
(TH 45, 56)
The social worker, Christine DeBlasio, testified that at the
time Virginia Corbitt was admitted to the nursing home, it was not
expected that she would remain there for a long period of time. (TH
8)

She noted that petitioner's treating physician, Dr. John B.

Stanchfield, had stated that to his knowledge Virginia Corbitt
would be able to return to her home after a short stay at the
nursing home. (NR 32, TH 9-10)

DeBlasio testified that because of

Virginia Corbitt's declining medical condition, including a series
of small strokes, it was determined in mid-March that she would not
be able to return home and that an application for Medicaid should
be initiated. (TH 61-62)
A representative of the Medicaid agency who appeared at the
hearing, testified that Corbitt's second application was denied on
the basis of state policy contained in Vol. Ill S 565-2.

The

representative testified that it is the Medicaid agency's policy
to sanction a client who transfers property on the same day as
entering a nursing home. (TH 51)

The agency representative

testified in part:
[B]ecause of the situation, because of the
medical condition at the point of the transfer
with her medical condition being that way and
entry into the nursing home on that same day,
we were basically saying that it was a
transfer to become eligible for Medicaid, so
we would apply the sanctions that I have just
indicated there. (TH 54)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Federal Medicaid regulations controlling Corbitt's case do not
mandate a denial of Medicaid benefits, when verification is not
completed within a 45-day period. A Medicaid agency is permitted
to keep the file open indefinitely, pending completion of the
application by the claimant.

In this case, the Director erred in

finding that Corbitt's initial application was properly denied.
The Federal statutes and regulations provide that a Medicaid
applicant who seeks benefits for nursing home care may be denied
eligibility for a transfer of assets, unless a satisfactory showing
is made that the transfer was for purposes other than to qualify
for Medicaid.

In this case, the hearing officer correctly found

that the transfer of assets was proper. The Director of DHCF, in
reviewing the hearing officer's decision, applied an erroneous
standard by concluding that an inference of ineligibility may be
drawn when an applicant enters a nursing home on the same day she
transfers property. The Director articulated no legitimate reasons
for reversing the favorable decision.

But for the improper state

policy, the Director should have affirmed the hearing officer's
decision finding Virginia Corbitt eligible for Medicaid.
The Director was not an impartial person for purposes of
reviewing the hearing officer's decision.

He had an interest in

the financial affairs of the Medicaid program.
have been disqualified from reviewing the case.

8

Thus, he should

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION UPHOLDING THE DENIAL OF CORBITT'S
FIRST APPLICATION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE VERIFICATION
SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE IT IS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS
INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE MEDICAID LAW.
The hearing officer held, and the Director of DHCF affirmed,
that Corbitt was not entitled to Medicaid eligibility on the basis
of her March 16, 1989 application, for the stated reason that she
had not provided verification as required by state policy and
procedure.

Corbitt's son, Whitney Corbitt, applied for benefits

on March 16, 1989 on behalf of his mother and was advised to
provide certain verification by March 28, 1989. Her son was uncible
to obtain the necessary documentation until the time of the hearing
on September 12, 1989. Certain bank records were provided to the
hearing officer within five days of the hearing as requested. (NR
13-20)

However, the hearing officer held the denial of the first

application to be proper, because Corbitt's son failed to provide
the requested verification within the time limit set by the
caseworker. The caseworker testified that there was "a time period
of 45 days" in which to make a decision on Corbitt's application.
(TH 25) Caseworker Anita Peterson also testified that 45 days was
the limit for processing an application: "There's 45 days or we
have to deny." (TH 28)
The hearing officer noted that the 45 day time limit for
providing verification may be extended by the agency, but concluded
it was unreasonable to expect the application to be held open
indefinitely pending verification.
9

(NR 29)

A review of the

Medicaid statute and regulation shows that a Medicaid agency is
not required to deny Medicaid when verification is not provided
within the 45-day time limit. The Director has failed to identify
a sufficient legal basis for concluding that the March 16, 1989
application was properly denied.
Medicaid is a complicated federal/state health program which
has been described as "among the most intricate ever drafted by
Congress."

Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, 69 L.Ed.

2d 460, 101 S. Ct.2633 (1981).

Since Medicaid is a joint health

care effort between the federal government and participating state
governments,

legal

determinations

necessarily

involve

a

consideration of both state and federal law, with federal law
controlling under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution.
This interrelationship has been well summarized in the case of
Buc kner

v.

Maher,

424

F.Supp.

366,

369

(D.

Conn.

1976).

Implementation of a Medicaid program is authorized in the state of
Utah by Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1988).
Neither the relevant federal statute nor the implementing
regulation prescribes a strict time limit for determining Medicaid
eligibility. The relevant portions of the federal Medicaid statute
provide as follows:
A state plan for medical assistance must —
....

(8) provide that all individuals wishing to
make application for medical assistance under
the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and
that such assistance shall be furnished with
reasonable
promptness
to
all
eligible
individuals;
10

(19)
provide such safeguards as may be
necessary to assure that eligibility for care
and
services
under
the
plan
will
be
determined, and such care and services will be
provided,
in
a manner
consistent
with
simplicity of administration and the best
interests of the recipients;

(34)
provide that in the case of any
individual who has been determined to be
eligible for medical assistance under the
plan, such assistance will be made available
to him for care and services included under
the plan and furnished in or after the third
month before the month in which he made
application (or application was made on his
behalf in the case of a deceased individual)
for such assistance if such individual was (or
upon application would have been) eligible for
such assistance at the time such care and
services were furnished;

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8),(19),(34)
The

relevant

federal

regulation

governing

timely

determinations of eligibility is found at 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 and
provides as follows:
(a) The agency must establish time standards
for determining eligibility and inform the
applicant of what they are. These standards
may not exceed —
(1) Sixty days for applicants who apply for
Medicaid on the basis of disability; and
(2)
Forty-five
days
for
all
other
applicants.
(b)
The time standards must cover the
period from the date of application to the
date the agency mails notice of its decision
to the applicant.
(c) The agency must determine eligibility
within the standards except
in unusual

11

circumstances, for example —
(1) When the agency cannot reach a decision
because
the
applicant
or
an
examining
physician delays or fails to take a required
action, or
(2)
Where there is an administrative or
other emergency beyond the agency's control.
(d) The agency must document the reasons
for delay in the applicant's case record.
(e)
The agency must not use the time
standards —
(1) As a waiting period before determining
eligibility; or
(2)
As a reason for denying eligibility
(because it has not determined eligibility
within the time standards).
The

state policy

and procedure manual which

applies

the

federal laws provides:
Eligibility Decisions
1.

Deadline for Determining Eligibility

A. An eligibility decision must be made within 45 days
of the date of the application. There is one exception:
a decision must be made within 90 days of the date of the
application if a disability determination must be made
as part of the eligibility determination.
If a decision cannot be made before the deadline,
document the cause of the delay in the case record.
Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 703-5 l.A.
Verification
What Must Be Verified?
All factors of eligibility must be verified.
There is only one exception to this rule. It is called
"The Prudent Person Concept". This assumes that, as a
prudent person, you can use your professional judgment
to decide if something can be left unverified. If you
decide to accept the client's word for something instead
of verifying it, document it in the case record or
application form. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM S 731-1.
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Who Must Provide Verification?
It is the responsibility of the applicant or recipient
to obtain acceptable verification of eligibility factors.
Help the client to get the verification if the client
needs help. Utah-DSS Vol, IIIM § 731-2. See Addendum
The fesderal law and regulations do not mandate denial of a
Medicaid

application

when

the

applicant

does

not

complete

verification within a forty-five day period. Instead, the law sets
out

a general

exceptions.

requirement

of

forty-five

days, with

certain

One of the exceptions contained in the federal

regulation is when the applicant delays in taking a required
action. In this case, the providing of additional verification was
a required action which was delayed by causes beyond Corbitt's
control. She relied on her son, Whitney Corbitt, to accomplish her
Medicaid eligibility.

Hie testified that because of his inability

to obtain documents from his lawyer, it was not possible to
complete the application within the stated time period. (TH 31)
This should have been considered by the hearing officer as an
extenuating circumstance which, under the federal regulation, would
permit the application file to be kept open beyond the forty-five
day time limit.

The Medicaid agency caseworker should not have

closed Corbitt's file, but should have simply noted in the file the
reason for the delay. Instead, the caseworker applied an improper
state policy which directed denial at the end of 45 days.
A

state

Medicaid

contradicts federal law.

agency

cannot

adopt

a

policy

which

It is well established in the case law

that a state regulation is invalid if found to be inconsistent with
13

the federal statute governing the program. Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282, 286, 92 S. Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed. 2d 448 (1971); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1118 (1968).
While a state's participation in Medicaid is voluntary, once it
elects to participate in the program, it must fully comply with
federal statutes and regulations.
175

(7th Cir. 1981).

Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172,

A participating state does have some

discretion in establishing time limits for filing claims, but such
limits have been construed as directory in nature, from which
exception should be granted to avoid an injustice when the facts
so demand. Matter of King James Nursing Home, 351 A.2d 363, 367
(1976).
When the facts in the case are considered in light of the
above-referenced law, it should be concluded that Corbitt was
improperly denied Medicaid eligibility on her first application.
The hearing officer did not consider the express language of the
federal regulation which permits additional time for determining
eligibility when delays are caused by the applicant.

Since the

federal law does not require a denial of an application under these
circumstances, any explicit or implicit requirements in the state
regulations requiring denial are inconsistent and invalid under the
Supremacy

Clause.

The

federal

regulation

clearly

reflects

congressional intent to permit exceptions to a harsh time limit
when equity and justice so require.

The facts of this case

demonstrate a solid basis for such an exception.
incapable of completing her own Medicaid application.
14

Corbitt was
She relied

on the assistance of her son who made a good faith effort to comply
with the caseworker's requirements. Since the federal law does not
strictly require compliance with a forty-five-day time limit, the
hearing officer should have granted more latitude and considered
the date of the first application as the effective date of
eligibility.
POINT II
THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE THE
DIRECTOR ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAN IN FINDING
THAT CORBITT TRANSFERRED ASSETS IN ORDER TO
QUALIFY FOR MEDICAID.
The Medicaid statute has for some time allowed states to
impose a penalty on persons who transfer assets in order to qualify
for Medicaid to cover nursing home expenses. Until recently, the
sanctioning of persons who made such transfers was optional.

42

U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1983). The statute provided that states could
deny assistance when a transfer was made within 24 months of
application, provided they specified a procedure implementing such
denial which was no more restrictive than that set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(1983). The referenced section was contained in
that portion of the Social Security Act governing the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program and contained a similar penalty for
transfers during a 24-month period.

Additionally, the statute

created a presumption that such transfers were made to establish
eligibility

for

assistance

"convincing

evidence

to

unless

establish

the
that

applicant
the

furnished

transaction

was

exclusively for some other purpose." 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(2)(1983)
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On July 1, 1988, the statutes referenced above were amended.
The Medicaid statute was amended to require states to sanction
individuals who transferred property for less than fair market
value during a 30-month period prior to applying for Medicaid. 42
U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(l)(1988)

Deleted from the Medicaid statute was

the previous cross-reference to the SSI statute in 42 U.S.C. §
1382b(c).

Instead, the Medicaid statute was revised to provide

that an individual need only make a "satisfactory showing" that the
transfer was made for a purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid.
Specifically, the statute now reads:
(2) An individual shall not be ineligible for
medical assistance by reason of paragraph (1)_
to the extent that —

(C) a satisfactory showing is made to the
State (in accordance with any regulations
promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the
individual intended to dispose of the
resources either at fair market value, or for
other valuable consideration, or (ii) the
resources were transferred exclusively for a
purpose other than to qualify for medical
assistance. 42 U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(2)(C)(1988)
At the time of Corbitt's hearing, the hearing officer applied
state regulations which were not in strict compliance with the
federal statute.

Included in the record as Exhibit 4 is Section

565-2 of Vol. IIIM regarding transfers of assets on or after July
1, 1988. (NR 57)

The applicable portion of that regulation

provided as follows:
Do not sanction the client if the client can
prove the asset was not transferred in order
to become eligible for Medicaid. It is the
client's responsibility to provide evidence
16

that a transfer was made for another purpose
AND that Medicaid was not even a minor factor
in the decision. If a reliance upon Medicaid
can be inferred,
sanction the client.
(emphasis added) Utah DSS-Vol. IIIM § 565-2
(7-89)1
Despite the state's use of a regulation which was more
restrictive than required by the Medicaid statute, the hearing
officer correctly found that Corbitt had established sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption that she had transferred
property to her son in order to qualify for Medicaid. Although the
hearing officer did not use the "satisfactory showing" standard,
it is clear from his decision that he felt the resources in
question were transferred for a purpose other than to qualify for
Medicaid. Reviewing the hearing officer's decision in light of the
correct standard cited above, it should be concluded that his
decision was based on substantial evidence as articulated in his
decision. Because of its relevance, the hearing officer's summary
is quoted in extenso;

lf

rhe pertinent section has since been revised to remove the
offensive final sentence. The most recent version of the IIIM
manual reads:
Do not sanction the client if the client can
prove the asset was not transferred in order
to become eligible for Medicaid. It is the
client's responsibility to provide evidence
that a transfer was made for another purpose
AND that Medicaid was not even a minor factor
in the decision.
Follow the guidelines in
Sec. 565-3. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM S 565-2.B (290)
The guidelines referred to in section 565-3 are contained in
the Addendum.
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The Petitioner in this case was fully aware of
her desire to transfer her assets as an
inheritance to her son and had taken steps to
do so in 1986. Under advice of counsel, and
with a divorce pending, it was prudent to
delay the transfer of the remaining equity in
the property to him until the divorce was
concluded. The testimony of the Petitioner's
son was that there was no expectation
whatsoever that she would be requiring
Medicaid when she had other insurance
available and it was anticipated that this
would be short term stay.
It was the
intervening small strokes that caused the
petitioner to lose her mental faculties,
creating a pressing need to obtain Medicaid
benefits. This all took place subsequent to
the quit claim deed being signed on February
23, 1989. The law provides for a presumption
that the transfer of assets was done in
contemplation of application for Medicaid
benefits,
but
the
testimony
of
the
Petitioner's son rebuts the presumption and
therefore prevails.
The only evidence
presented at the hearing on this issue showed
that the Petitioner was anticipated to have a
short stay at the nursing home which would
preclude any expectation of a long term stay,
especially of the type of serious nature that
developed
in this Petitioner's medical
condition. (NR 28) See Addendum
When the hearing officer's decision reached the Director of
DHCF, an incorrect standard was applied in reviewing the findings.
The Director states in his decision:
In this case, the Division of Health Care
Financing finds that based upon the hearing
record, a reliance upon Medicaid can be
inferred....Reliance upon Medicaid can be
inferred when an eighty-one-year-old woman
such as petitioner enters a nursing home,
gives her son the power-of-attorney and quit
claims her dwelling to him on the same
day....However, a reasonable inference can be
drawn that reliance upon Medicaid was
contemplated....(emphasis added) (NR 23-24)
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The Director erred in not applying the proper standard for
judging whether a transfer of assets was made to qualify for
Medicaid. The statute clearly requires that an applicant need only
make a "satisfactory showing"; it says nothing about drawing an
inference from facts established at the hearing.

The hearing

officer had already found that the presumption of a disqualifying
transfer had been overcome. To allow the Director in reviewing the
decision to draw a different inference from the facts results in
the presumption being reconstituted and, in effect, makes it
irrebuttable.

Such a result is not condoned in the law.

See

People in Interest of S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Colo. 1982).
Reliance on an inference in a case of this type was rejected
in Harrison v. Comm'r, 529 A.2d 188 (Conn. 1987) wherein the
Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed a transfer of assets under the
old statute.

The Connecticut Medicaid agency had included a

"foreseeability test" in its manual and provided that if an
applicant

had

failed

to

retain

sufficient

assets

to

meet

foreseeable needs for 24 months after the transfer, "it must be
inferred" that the transfer was not made exclusively for some other
purpose than to qualify for Medicaid. The court began its analysis
by noting the fundamental rule that an administrative agency must
act within its statutory mandate and "has no authority to modify,
abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which
it acquirers authority." Id., at 192.
Connecticut

regulations

under

the

19

old

The court reviewed the
"convincing

evidence"

standard of 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c) and concluded that the department
policy was inconsistent with federal and state statutes.
An overly restrictive transfer of assets rule was also
reviewed and rejected in Randall v. Lukhard, 709 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.
1983)

The court held that a Virginia rule requiring documentary

evidence in every case showing that a claimant has other resources
available at the time of transfer to cover present and expected
future medical expenses was excessive.

The court found it highly

improbable that disabled individuals would be able to objectively
demonstrate availability of other assets to avoid disqualification.
The court stated:
We think that they should not be rendered
ineligible if by other credible evidence,
short of documentary proof, they can establish
that theirs was a lawful purpose. Id., at 267
In Downer v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 705 P.2d 144 (Nev.
1985), a ninety-year-old individual who transferred property to his
daughter and son-in-law prior to applying for Medicaid was held to
be not disqualified.

The court concluded that the Medicaid

applicant could not have anticipated an application for Medicaid,
because he believed his death was imminent.
Recent amendments to respondent's regulations further suggest
that the "inference" language is not permissible.

As noted, the

offending sentence has now been removed. See supra. at 17, n.l.
Second, a set of guidelines has been added for determining whether
a transfer was made in order to qualify for Medicaid.
Vol. IIIM § 565-3

(11-89).

Utah-DSS

Although the guidelines may be

questionable in light of Randall v. Lukhard, supra, they do contain
20

two criteria which lend support to petitioner's argument.

The

section provides in part:
Some Factors Indicating the Transfer Was Not
to Become Eligible
Here is a list of some factors which may
indicate the client did not transfer assets to
become eligible and did not expect Medicaid to
meet his needs after the transfer. This list
is not all-inclusive.
A.

The client suddenly, unexpectedly, became
disabled AFTER the transfer.

B. The client learned that he has a disabling
condition AFTER the transfer. Utah-DSS
Vol. IIIM § 565-3 2. (11-89)
In this case, the evidence established, and the hearing
officer found, that Corbitt's incapacitating condition arose after
she was admitted to the nursing home on February 23, 1989. Based
on respondent's own regulations, that finding is entitled to
substantial weight.

The hearing officer who reviewed Corbitt's

case, and who had the best opportunity to judge her credibility,
concluded that the transfer of property was not made for a
disqualifying purpose.

When his decision was reviewed by the

Director, an improper standard utilizing an inference was applied.
At the time of the review, the Medicaid statute did not contain any
language allowing the Director of DHCF to draw an inference from
facts established at a hearing. Instead, the Director was required
to determine whether a satisfactory showing had been made that the
transfer was for some purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid.
The Director articulated no legitimate reasons for reversing the
hearing officer's decision.

His reversal represents an arbitrary
21

act in complete disregard of the Medicaid statute.

Under the

principles of law governing the relationship between the state and
federal participants in the Medicaid program, it was improper for
the Director to apply such a standard. A review of the law and the
record shows that the hearing officer applied the correct legal
standard and identified substantial evidence upon which to base
his decision.

Therefore, the Director's decision should be

reversed and the hearing officer's holding reinstated, finding
Corbitt eligible for Medicaid.
POINT III
THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
SINCE HE WAS SUBJECT TO DISQUALIFICATION
BECAUSE OF HIS FINANCIAL INTEREST IN
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM.
The statute establishing the Medicaid program also provides
that an opportunity for a fair hearing must be provided to
individuals denied medical assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(3) (1983).
The statute is implemented in the federal regulations at 42 C.F.R.
S 431.200 et seq..

The regulation provides that the state's

hearing system must provide for:
(1) a hearing before the agency; or
(2) an evidentiary hearing at the local level, with the
right of appeal to a state agency hearing.
42 C.F.R. § 431.205(1985)
The regulation then provides that if a local evidentiary hearing
decision is adverse to an applicant or recipient, the agency must
inform the individual of a right of appeal to the state agency.
42 C.F.R. S 431.232

The regulations require that a state plan
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provide the necessary means for meeting the hearing requirements
listed.
The state of Utah provides hearing rights in its regulations
for applicants and recipients. Utah Admin. Code § R455-14 et seq. .
A hearing officer is to conduct a fair hearing, but is not
empowered to issue a final agency decision.

Instead, at the

conclusion of the formal hearing, the hearing officer is to submit
a recommended decision to the executive director of DOH who will
then decide whether to accept or reject it.

Judicial review is

then to be allowed from the executive director's decision.

See

Addendum.
The result of the review system established by the state of
Utah DOH is that every fair hearing decision is reviewed by the
Director of the Medicaid program who is also responsible for
conserving the limited resources of the Medicaid program.

Utah

provides by statute for creation of DHCF and for the appointment
of a Director by the DOH executive director. Utah Code Ann. § 2618-2.2. Among the responsibilities of the director of DHCF is to
"prepare and administer the division's budget..." Id. The statute
further

provides

that

the division

"is responsible

for the

effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an
efficient, economical manner."

Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3.

Finally, it provides:
The division shall establish, on a statewide
basis, a program to safeguard against
unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid
services, excessive payments, and unnecessary
or inappropriate hospital admissions or
lengths of stay. Id.
23

It is well established in the law that an adjudicator of an
administrative claim is disqualified if he has a pecuniary interest
in the outcome. Myer v. Niles Township, 477 F.Supp. 357# 362 (N.D.
111. 1979). The adjudicator is disqualified even if the pecuniary
interest is no more than an indirect outgrowth of a desire to
protect official funds. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed. 2d 267(1972) (A mayor responsible for
village finances and whose court generated village funds was
disqualified from trying traffic offenses.)

In Myer, the court

held that a panel of township supervisors who had the sole
discretion to determine an applicant's eligibility for medical
indigent benefits and who also had an interest in protecting
township funds could not provide a fair hearing before an unbiased
decision-maker.

Myer v. Niles Township, supra, at 362.

In this case, Director Betit has a direct, statutorilymandated obligation to protect and conserve scarce Medicaid funds.
Given Director Betit's pecuniary interest in protecting Medicaid
funds, he could not act as an impartial agency officer in reviewing
Corbitt's claim. Therefore, he should have been disqualified from
reviewing the hearing officer's decision.
CONCLUSION
The Director erred in finding that Corbitt's first application
was correctly denied.

He further erred in reversing the hearing

officer and finding a disqualifying transfer of assets. The
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Director's decision should be reversed and Medicaid benefits
granted from the date of the first application.
Respectfully submitted this^?A^ day of /ff^fcA^

, 1990.

[CHAEL E. BULSON
Attorney for Petitioner
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A D D E N D U M

VOLUME IIIM

2-90
TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfers On or After July 1, 1988

565-2

Ti^ajisf_eiLS„.0n„Qt:_ AF. ter_ . Ju ly._L_1988
1.

Nhen to Sanction Clients
Sanction clients who transfer assets for less than fair market
value to become eligible for Medicaid. It does not matter if
the client is a resident of a medical institution or approved
for the Home and Lommunity-Based Care Waiver at the time of the
transfer.

2.

When NOT to Sanction Clients
Do not sanction clients in these situations:
A.

Do not sanction the client If the asset was transferred
more than 30 months prior to the date of the application.

Bo

Do not sanction the client if the client can prove the
asset was not transferred in order to become eligible for
Medicaid. It is the client's responsibility to provide
evidence that a transfer was made for another purpose AND
that Medicaid was not even a minor factor in the decision.
Follow the guidelines in Sec. 565-3.

C.

Do not sanction the client if the sanction would be an
undue hardship. Follow the rules in Sec. 565-4.

D.

Do not sanction the client if the transfer fits one of the
following situations. (The "5 OK Transfers")
(1)

Transfer .of a home to the spouse.

(2)

Transfer of any asset to a spouse OR a blind or
disabled son or daughter.

(3)

Transfer of a home to a son or daughter under 21 years
of age.

(4)

Transfer of a home to a sibling who has an equity
interest in the home and who has lived in the home for
at least 1 year immediately preceding the client's
entry into a medical institution.

(5)

Transfer of a home to a son or a daughter who has
lived in the home and cared for the client for at
least 2 years prior to the individual's entry into the
medical institution.
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3.

Secondary Transfers After October 1. 1989
If assets have been transferred without sanction because the
situation Is one identified In Sec. 565-2 #2(D), sanction the client
If the asset 1s transferred again AFTER October 1, 1989 for less than
fair market value.
Sanction the Individual making the first transfer. The sanction
period for the Individual must be based on the value of the asset
that person transferred. If the person making the secondary transfer
also transfers some of his own assets 1n addition to the assets
received from the first transfer, that person may also be sanctioned.
The sanction period for either individual begins on the date of the
secondary transfer.
THERE IS ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE: Do not sanction anyone if the
secondary transfer also fits one of the situations in Sec. 565-2.

EXAMPLE:
Mary and Bob Jones were both identified on the deed as ownnf\s of their home, which
is worth $36,000. Before entering a nursing home in June, Mary transferred her 112
interest in the home to her husband. Mary was not sanction for this transfer because
Sec. 565-2 #2(D) says that a client may transfer any asset to a spouse without being
sanctioned.
In October, Bob Jones signed a quit claim deed giving the house to his son for $1.00.
His son is over 21, not disabled, and had not been living in the house prior to the
transfer. Bob is sanctioned for the transfer of his half of the house. Mary is sanctioned
for the half of the house she gave to Bob and he transferred. The sanctions begin in
August for both of them.
4.

How to Sanction the Client
Clients who are sanctioned for t r a n s f e r r i n g assets are not e l i g i b l e
for i n s t i t u t i o n a l care or Home and Community-Based Care. They may be
e l i g i b l e f o r regular Medicaid services. Apply the Medicaid policy In
Volume H I D .
Report the c l i e n t ' s name and PACMIS ID number to either PDU or Health
Care Financing. You may do this on the phone, in w r i t i n g , or by
PACMIS Mailbox addressed to Jennifer P. Lee.

565-2

Page 2
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5.

getting the Sanction, Pgrigd
A.

The period of ineligibility begins with the month in which the
assets were last transferred. The client is ineligible for the
LESSER of:
(1)

30 months, OR

(2)

the number of months resulting from dividing the
uncompensated value by the average private-pay rate for
nursing homes. The uncompensated value is the difference
between the equity value of the transferred asset and the
amount of money received by the client for it. (Equity
value is the fair market value minus any indebtedness
against the asset.) See Table II for the average
private-pay rate for nursing homes.

565-2

Page 3

VOLUME JIIM

11-89
TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfer to Become Eligible

565-3

Transfer to Become Eligible
Do not sanction the client If the client can prove that Medicaid was
not a reason for the transfer. The client must also prove that he
did not expect Medicaid to meet his needs after transferring the
asset.
1.

Verification
It Is the client's responsibility to provide all supporting
documentation, such as legal documents, realtor agreements,
relevant correspondence, and statements from other Individuals.
If the client needs help getting these, a worker may help.
If the client claims that Medicaid was not a factor In the
decision to transfer the asset, ask the client to write a
statement explaining:
A.

The reason for the transfer

B,

Attempts to transfer the asset for fair market value

C-

The reason for accepting less than fair market value

D.

The client's plans for providing for himself after the
transfer

E.

The cl1ent f s relationship i

P.

^ e c'^ot
tne asset

-

•

- the asset

believes he received fair market value for
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2.

Some Factors Indicating the Transfer Has Not to Become Eligible
Here 1s a l i s t of some factors which may Indicate the client did
not transfer assets to become eligible and did not expect
Medicaid to meet his needs after the transfer. This l i s t is not
all-inclusive.
A.

Th6 client suddenly, unexpectedly, became disabled AFTER
the transfer.

B.

The client learned that he had a disabling condition AFTER
the transfer.

C.

The client unexpectedly lost other assets, worth more than
the Medicaid asset l i m i t , AFTER the transfer.

D.

The transfer was court-ordered.

E.

The assets were transferred to a religious order by a
member of that order in accordance with a vow of poverty.

Mr, Johnson applied for Medicaid in May. The previous June, he had sold assets
worth $8,000 for $6,000, He explained that he sold the assets to pay $4,000 in medical
bills. He accepted less than fair market value because he needed the money quickly
and could not wait for a better offer. When he transferred the money, his countable
assets were loo high for Medicaid because he also owned farmland in Nevada worth
$12,000. In January, he and his wife separated. She was given the farmland in the
divorce decree. Now his assets are below the asset limit, Mr. Johnson's claim that he
did not transfer the assets to become eligible should be accepted because he tried to
sell the asset for fair market value AND he would have remained ineligible for
Medicaid if he had not unexpectedly lost the farmland.
In February, Mrs. Mason transferred assets worth $53,000 to her daughter in exchange
for a life estate in the daughter's home. The life estate is worth $40,000. She did it
because she was elderly and no longer able to live alone. She did not want to move
into her daughter's home without paying her for it in some way. DO NOT accept Mrs.
Mason's claim that the transfer was not done to become eligible. Mrs. Mason knew
that she was getting older and would probably need medical care in the future. The
home could have been sold for fair market value and the difference between its value
and the life estate value could have been used for her medical needs. Instead of
reserving her assets to provide for her medical care, she impoverished herself This is
evidence of an expectation that Medicaid would take care of her medical needs.
565-3 Page 2

VOLUME IIIM

3-90
APPLICATIONS - Eligibility Decisions

703-5

Eligibility Decisions
1.

Deadline for Determining Eligibility
A.

An eligibility decision must be made within 45 days of the
date of the application. There Is one exception: a
decision must be made within 90 days o f the date of the
application if a disability determination must be made as
part of the eligibility determination.
If a decision cannot be made before, the dead 111 ie( dc ci tmei it
the cause of the delay In the case record.

B.

If unverified eligibility factors do not affect the
eligibility of the entire household (For example, the
client has not given proof of citizenship for one c h i l d . ) ,
the application may be approved for those members
determined elIgible.
The application cannot be approved if unverified
eligibility factors affect the whole household. (For
example, the wages of a working parent are unverified.)

2.

Certification of Decision
Indicate the eligibility decision on the last page of Form 61A
or Form 61FC. Record the eligibility decision on Form 727 Case
Action Log.

3,.

A.

If the application is denied, note the date and the reason
for the denial.

B.

If the application is approved, Indicate the date and
category of assistance.

Notification of Approval or Denial
If the application Is approved or denied, notify the applicant
in writing of the approval or denial, the reason for the action,
the policy citation 1n this m a n u a l , and the Social Services
office to contact for information on the income method used to
determine the spenddown.

4

ALERTS and PENDS
Put an ALERT on a case when a change 1s expected to occur before
the next review if that change will not affect eligibility.
Put a PEND on a case if a change is expected to occur before the
next review if that change will affect eligibility. Also use
PENDS to ensure that Information or proofs are collected from
the clientc
703-5
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731

Verification

731-1

What Must Be Verified?
All factors of eligibility must be verified.
There isvonly one exception to this rule. It.is called "The Prudent
Person Concept". This assumes that, as a prudent, person, you can use
your professional judgement to decide if something can be left
unverified. If you decide to accept the client's-word for something
instead of verifying it, document it in the case record or
application form.

731-2

Who Must Provide Verification!
It is the responsibility of the applicant or recipient to obtain
acceptable verification of eligibility factors. Help the client to
get the verification if the client needs help.

731-3

What is Acceptable Verification?
Verification may be those items listed on the Verification Tables or
other documents accepted by the district worker.
File copies of acceptable documents in the case record. When a
narrative record is used to record verification of items for which
there is no document, attach a sheet of paper in the case record. On
the sheet of paper, explain how that item was verified. Sign and
date the paper.

731-4

Primary VQjdJlgAtjon
The verification tables list examples of acceptable verification for
each eligibility factor for the appropriate category and program.
Once an eligibility factor has been verified, no further verification
is necessary unless it is an. item subject to cliau^e aud would be
reverified at a regular time.

731
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granted to an applicant,4recipient 'of J"provider if the
sole issue(s) is a Federal or State law'or'policyRequiring an automatic change in covered services • adversely affecting some or all (applicants) \ recipients or
providers (42 CFR 431.220).
f
c. A hearing also is not required'and will'not'be
granted to a. provider for Medicaid certification
surveys, plans of correction pursuant to thbse surveys
or inspections of care, when such state' agency action
is required by' federal1 statute, or regulation' to be
conducted according to federal procedures '(Section
63-46b-l(2)(l) U. / C. * A.' (1988)/ ,42 " CFR, i,431,
Subpart D).'<
(1) Any Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF),1 Intermediate Care Facility (ICF) or Intermediate Care Facility/
Mentally t Retarded (ICF/MR) ,whose certification or
provider' agreement is denied, terminated'- or* not
renewed Will be governed by, the evidentiary hearing
procedures set forth in 42 CFR 431.153,1 including
appropriate cross-references to 42 * CFR : Part 498,
with the offering of an informal reconsideration in
accordance with 42 CFR* 43 L154 prior to the conducting of a full evidentiary Rearing. All of "the federal
regulatory citations in this subsection' are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.
(2) Any SNF, ICF'or ICF/MR ; whose'payment
for new admissions is denied will be governed by the
informal hearing procedures set forth in 42 CFR
442.118 and 442.119, includingJ appropriate' crossreference to 42 CFR 489.62 as specifically^concerns
SNFs. All of the federal regulatory citations in this
subsection are incorporated herein as if set'forth in
full.
2. Applicability
" EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED 'HEREIN;'* THESE
PROVISIONS ONLY -APPLY TO1 TITLE XIX
I9ST 26°l~$
MEDICAID/UMAP ' RECIPIENTS^ OR' * PROVIDERS. These rules do not apply to initial applications for 'medical "assistance. *A'* Medicaid/UMAP
R455-14. Division of Health Care
4
applicant who has been denied eligibility for medical
Financing Administrative Hearing
assistance through 'the local Office' of Community
Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP
Operations (OCO), Assistance Payments11 Administration (APA), Department1 of1 Social Services^ (DSS),
Applicants, Recipients and Providers
must submit a written request for an eligibility deteR455-14-0. Policy Statement
rmination hearing' to: The Department, of-# Social
R455-14-1. Administrative Hearing Procedure* Provide
Services1, Office of Administrative Hearings, <#P. 0.
R455-14-2. Discovery
Box 45500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500 Or the
R455-I4-3. Declaratory Orders
applicant may deliver the written request in person to
the local OCO.
R455-14-0. Policy Statement
3. Eligibility Hearing ' for * both Non-Medical
It is the policy of the Division of Health Care
Financing to resolve disputes at the lowest level. The Assistance AND Medical Assistance
If eligibility for a non-medical» assistance
following rules are not meant to foreclose the Diviprogram(s) in addition to Medicaid/UMAPf is "at
sion's preference, for informal resolutions through
open discussion and negotiation between the DiviJ issue, the Medicaid/UMAP eligibility determination
hearing shall be conducted by the Department' of
sion, and applicants, recipients and providers.
Social. Services through the Office of Administrative
R455-14-1. Administrative Hearing Procedures
Hearings. Requests for such hearings shall be* sent 'to
Provide
the address in Section 2, above. All such hearings
Ai HEARING PROVISIONS
shall be conducted according to DSS hearing rules.
1. Hearing Responsibility
DSS shall propose a recommended decision 'concera.« In accordance with Section 1902(a)(3) of the ning the medical assistance issue(s) 'only and shall
Social Security Act, 42 Code of Federal Regulations submit it to the Executive Director pf DOH or his/
(CFR) Part- 431, Subpart E, Sections 26-M.l and
her designated representative for agenc/ review.
26-23-2 IL C.'AJ (1953), and 63-46b-l, et seq.
Thereafter the recommended' decision "shall 'be
U. t C. AJ (1987)/ ail* Title XIX (Medicaid)/Utah
handled in accordance with 'SectionsV 63-466-12
Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) recipients or and 63-46b-15,U.C.A. (1987).
providers (and applicants under certain circumsta4. Eligibility Hearing For Medical Assistance Only'
nces) aggrieved by any action; or inaction of the
i AH requests for hearings to consider eligibilityf as
Department'of Health (DOH), Division of Health
to medical assistance only, shall beJ forwarded^"by
Care Financing (DHCF), will be given an opportu-' DSS to DHCF* A formal hearing irr'accordance with
nity for a hearing upon written request. M i ' l« - ^ i the hearing procedures herein shall be. conducted!by
bo A hearing < is not required and will not < be DHCF.
pliance had occurred. The written request from the
provider must be submitted by him/her to:
Division of Health Care Financing
Bureau of Program Review
ATTN: PEER REVIEW
PIO. Box 16580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580
This written request will be submitted to the appropriate Professional Society requesting that their
Peer Review Committee conduct a formal peer
review of the Division of Health Care Financing
determination.
The informal hearing requirements' of Sec. 26-23i-(l) UCA, (1953) are satisfied by1 the professional
peer review process.'
If either the Division of Health Care Financing or
the the provider is dissatisfied with the results of the
formal peer -review they may request a formal
hearing before the Department of Health pursuant to
Sec. 23-32-2, UCA (1953) by complying with the
formal hearing procedures set forth in the Division
of Health Care Financing ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARING PROCEDURES.
In situations of violations of compliance of professionally recognized medical standards, identified by
peer review, the Division of Health Care Financing
may pursue any legal sanction for recovery of overpayments;
• Should Federal Financial Participation (the amount
the federal government contributes to provider reimbursement) be disallowed on reimbursements made
to the provider, the provider" will reimburse to the
State the total amount that the State paid for the
services disallowed (including' Federal audit, quality
assurance review,' or prior authorization requirements) only if the provider was at fault.

566

'0>i>i'«Co
* Pfc>vu v IJlith

UTAHADMINtSTltftlVE

CODE

1989

.,.

»,

m

,

, Health Care

* 5. Definitions"
' The definitions of the5 Utah Administrative Procedure fAct» (UAPA), Section 63-46b-l, et seq., U.
C.J-A.* (1987) as set forth in Section 63-46b-2 are
hereby incorporated by reference. In addition: '
a. "Action" means a' denial of Medicaid/UMAP
eligibility as5 regards an'applicant; denial, termination, suspension, or - reduction of Medicaid/UMAP
covered services in the case of recipients; or, a reduction or denial of reimbursement for such services,
findings of licensing survey deficiencies requiring a
Plan of Correction, failure of DHCF to accept a
Plan of Correction required by licensing, or other
sanctions as "set forth' in "DHCF ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS" PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES', R455-22, in the case of providers.
b. 'Aggrieved Person* means any applicant, recipient or provider' aggrieved by any action or inaction
of DHCF.
c. "Date of''Action*'means the date on which a
denial of eligibility for, termination, suspension or
reduction' of Medicaid/UMAP covered services
becomes effective, in the case of applicants or recipients; or, in the case of providers the date on which:
1
(1) A reduction oi* denial or reimbursement or
sanction becomes effective;
(2) Notice is given of licensing1 survey'deficiencies;
or

i

* >

(3)'Notice'Is' given that'lDHCF will not accept a
plan of correction of survey deficiencies required by
licensing.
d. "Division Director* means the Director of the
Division of" Health Care Financing of the Utah
Department of Health or his/her designated and
authorized representative.
'•
e. "Executive Director* means the Executive Director v of the Utah Department of Health or his/her
designated and authorized representative.
t
f. ;*Formal Hearing" means a hearing before a
hearing officer, conducted in* accordance with
UAPA.
' g, "Notice"* means a written statement of the
action DHCF intends to take, the reasons for the
intended action, the specific regulations that support
(or the change in Federal or State law that requires)
the'action, the right to a hearing when applicable,
the procedure to obtain a hearing, and an explanation of the circumstances under which Medicaid/
UMAP benefits or reimbursement will be continued
if a hearing is requested.
, hM "Request for a Formal Hearing*" means a clear
expression in, writing which meets the criteria of a
"Request for Agency Action* as set forth by Section
63-46b-3(2)(c), U. >C. A, (1987) by an aggrieved
person or authorized representative.
6. Notice
(,
4
a. When Notice Required
Every individual who is affected by an adverse
action taken by DHCF will be given timely notice.
b. Content of Notice
, (
A notice under this Section must contain:
,
t (!) A statement of the action DHCF intends to
take;
(2) The date the intended action takes effect;
u (3) The reasons for the intended action;
(4) The specific regulations that support, or the
change in Federal or State law or policy, that requires the action; t
4(5) tThc ^aggrieved person's right to request a
formal hearing before DHCF, when applicable, and
the method by which such hearing may be obtained
from DHCF; m

' (6) A statement that the aggrieved person may
represent himself or use legal counsel, relative, friend
or other spokesman at the formal hearing; and, '
(7) An explanation of the circumstances "under
which' Medicaid/UMAP coverage or reimbursement
will be continued if a formal hearing is timely requested.
c. Advance Notice
DHCF will mail a notice at least ten (10) calendar
days before the date of the intended action EXCEPT
as noted below:
(1) DHCF may mail'a notice not later than the
date of action if:
(a) DHCF has factual information confirming the
death of a recipient/provider;
(b) DHCF receives a clear written statement signed
by a recipient/provider that:
1) He/she no longer wishes services or reimbursement, or
'
2) Gives information that requires termination or
reduction of services or reimbursement and indicates
that he/she understands that this must be the result
of supplying that information;
(c) The recipient has been admitted to an institution where he/she is ineligible under the State Plan
for further services;
(d) The recipient/provider's whereabouts are
unknown and the Post Office returns DHCF mail
directed to him/her indicating no forwarding
address;
(e) DHCF establishes the fact that the recipient has
been accepted for Medicaid/UMAP services by
another local jurisdiction, State, Territory or Commonwealth; "
(0 A change in the level of medical care is prescribed by the recipient's physician; or
(g) A termination, suspension or reduction of
Medicaid/UMAP covered services or reimbursement
is necessitated- by an imminent peril to the public
health, safety, or welfare.
(2) DHCF may shorten the period of advance
mailed notice to five (5) days before the date of
action if:
(a) DHCF has facts indicating that action' should
be taken because of probable fraud by the applicant/
recipient/provider; and
(b) The facts have been verified, by affidavit, if
possible.
7. Request for Formal Hearing and Agency Response
Formal hearings are held for "medical assistance
only" issues. If an aggrieved person's request for an
eligibility hearing concerns both non-medical assistance and medical assistance, he should refer to R45514-l.A.3,above.
An aggrieved person may request a formal hearing
within the following -deadlines, depending upon the
type of request:
a. An aggrieved UMAP or Medicaid provider may
request a formal hearing within 30 calendar days
from the date written notice is issued or mailed,
whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or inaction.
'
,
b. An aggrieved Medicaid applicant or recipient
may request a formal hearing regarding eligibility for
"medical assistance only" within 90 calendar days
from the date written notice is issued or mailed,
whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or intended
action. , »
»
1
!
c. An aggrieved UMAP applicant or recipient may
request a formal hearing regarding eligibility within
90 calendar days from the date written notice is
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issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of an
action oc intended action,
d. An aggrieved UMAP applicant or.recipient may
.request a formal hearing regarding scope of service
within 30 calendar days from, the date written notice
is .issued or mailed, whichever is later,, by t DHCF of
an action or intended action^
e. Failure to submit a timely request for a formal
hearing will constitute a waiver f of a person's formal
hearing* or pre-hearing rights. A request for a
hearing shall be in writing, shall be dated,,and shall;
explain the reasons for which the hearing is reque-j
sted. An aggrieved person may use the hearing
request form which, is attached to all negative eligi-<
bility action notices, or the form which is provided in
Attachment "A,*- which is entitled "Requests for
Hearing/Agency Action." DHCF will provide copies
of*the, form in• Attachment A to all interested,
persons. The address for submitting a "Request' forj
Hearing/Agency k Action" for: (a) Medicaid or
UMAP providers; and (b) Medicaid or UMAP scope
of service hearings is as follows:
Division of Health Care Financing
,. Attention: Formal Hearings
•• <
M . P.O. Box 16580
' Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580
The address for submitting a "Request for Hearing/
Agency,,Action for Medicaid and UMAP applicants
regarding eligibility issues is:
The Department of Social Services
~ Office of Administrative Hearings
^P.O.Box 45500
„. Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500
f
f. Requests for formal hearing will be docketed
and scheduled within 30 calendar days. DHCF as
respondent shall schedule a hearing or begin negoti-'
ations in the matter in writing within 30 days of the
date of issuance ot the request for formal hearing or
agency action.
''
•
i 8. Denial or Dismissal of Request for a Hearing
« DOH or DHCF may deny or dismiss,a,request forj
a formal hearing if:, ,' ',
,
\
a. The aggrieved person withdraws the request in
writing; , . , . „ ,
,,,,,'
b. The aggrieved person fails to appear at a ,sche-,
duled hearing without good cause; or
i
c. The provider fails to allow DHCF access to its
records pursuant to R455-14-2 below.
9, Reinstatement/Continuation of Services
(
^ a. DHCF may reinstate services for recipients or,
suspend any adverse action for providers as defined
in Section 5.a if an aggrieved person requests an;
formal hearing not more than ten (10) calendar days,
!
after the date of action.
' '1r
'
\
b. DHCF must reinstate or continue services forj
recipients or suspend adverse actions for providers
until a decision is rendered after a formal hearing if:
j
(I) Adverse action is taken without giving the ten
(10) day advanced mailed notice to a recipient/
provider in all circumstances where such' advance
!
[
notice is required; ' \ '
' ''
' '*'
|
" (2) In those circumstances where advance notice is
not required, as set forth in section 6.c.(l); the agg-"
rieved person requests a formal hearing within ten}
(10) calendar' days following the date the adverse
action notice is mailed; r
•}
- '' J''"' . <* ' i
(3)1 DHCF determines that the action resulted from1
other'than the application of Federal or State law or
policy.
c. DHCF may proceed with it} intended action if:<
' " ( l ) T h e aggrieved person withdraws'his request fori
either a formal hearing in writing; or,
u
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(2) The aggrieved ' person prolongable,,Rearing
process without good cause; or,
" ( 3 ) A j recipient's whereabouts. > are i unknown,'>, as
indicated by the return of agency mail .directed" to
him/her which is not forwardable,,
n, 10. Formal Hearing > ' >
'; t a. How to Request a Formal Hearing
A request for a formal hearing must, be made to
the Division of Health . Care Financing, 288 1 North
1460 West, P. O. Box 16580,'Salt Lake City, Utah
84116-0580, Attention: "Formal Hearings.*b. Notice of Formal Hearing
DHCF shall notify the aggrieved, person and/or
his/her attorney, in writing, of the date, time and
place, of the hearing. Notice, shall *be mailed not less
than ten (10) calendar days, before the scheduled, date
of the formal hearing.
1 c. Form of Papers
All papers to be filed in a formal hearing shall)
(1) Be typewritten or legibly hand-written;
' (2) Bear a caption clearly showing, the title of the
hearing;
, > (3) Bear the docket number, if any; ,
(4) Be dated and signed by the party or his/her
authorized representative and shall,, contain > his/her
address and telephone number; and >l "< * :i>t\ • V!^J
, (5) Consist of an, original and two (2) copies tailed
with DHCF.
Hearings may be delayed until»these requirements
are met.
d. Service
j (1) The party filing papers and documents shall
serve them upon all parties to the formal r hearing.
Proof of service shall be filed with DHCF.» J,' r ,. ' /
(2) Service shall be personally delivered or by mail,
properly addressed with postage prepaid,', one (1)
copy to each party entitled thereto. When at party is
representee! by an attorney, service upon the attorney
shall be deemed service upon the party or parties-., 'l '
(3) Proof of service shall be by certificate, affidavit
or acknowledgment.
*' «" • »i *! "* X\'J ."
(4) Wherever notice by DHCF is required, notification shall be effective upon the date of first.class
mailing to a party's residence or business address. *')**
(5) In addition to the methods set forth. in, these
rules, a party may be served in any manner permitted
by law.
' e. Intervention
l>
As permitted by ' Utah ' Code rAnn!k 63-46b-10,
' intervention will be permitted provided the following
requirements are met:
(1) Persons desiring to intervene in a formal
hearing must petition for leave to intervene'at least
seven (7) days before the scheduled hearing,,'.unless
otherwise permitted by the hearing officer. * • '.
(2) The petition must contain a clear and concise
statement of the direct and substantial interest of the
person seeking leave to intervene in the hearing. l *J
(3) Persons seeking affirmative relief shall state the
basis of such relief.'
(4) Other parties to the hearing ' must, have an
opportunity to support or oppose intervention. /}*" *K
' (5) The hearing'officer may grant leave'to intervene subject to such reasonable conditions as he may
prescribe. An intervenor may be 'dismissed from the
hearing if it appears that he has no direct or substantial interest in the hearing.
f. Conduct of Hearing
(1) Formal hearings shall be conducted by an
impartial hearing officer who is appointed by DOH.
The hearing officer shall be empowered with 1 such
authority as granted by Section 63-46b-U; et seq.
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U. O * A * (1987), except as may be limited by these
ruJcs4 ,No t hearing t officer- shall have been directly
involved Jn, the.i initial determination* of. the action in
question.'
\it (2) i All formal - hearings shall be ^conducted only
after adequate written notice of the hearing has been
served.on all parties setting forth the time,.date and
place of the hearing, , '
t (3) Testimony shall be taken.; under oath; or affirmation administered by the hearing officer^
(4) Each party shall have the right to:, *,
(a) call and examine parties and witnesses:
(b) introduce exhibits;
(c) question opposing, witnesses and parties on any
matter relevant to the issue even though the matter
was not covered in the direct examination; ,..
*
(d) impeach any witness regardless of which party
first called him/her to testify; and
(e) rebut the evidence against him/her.
g (5) The rules of evidence as applied in civil actions
in the courts of this* State shall be generally followed
in the hearings.' Any relevant evidence may be admitted if It is the type of evidence commonly relied
upon byi prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
Hearsay»ievidencc;mayj be used for the purpose of
supplementing or explaining other evidence, but shall
not be sufficient by, itself to support a finding unless
it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.
The,hearing officer shall give effect to the rules of
privilege recognized». by law.** Irrelevant, immaterial
and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. >
•r (6), J*heshearing officer may order-the taking of
interrogatories and depositions and assess the expense
to the requesting; party if the hearing officer deems it
proper.
;. (7) The} hearing offleet] may questioa any party i or
witness(and may admit,any evidence he believes is
relevant or material.
.•, (8).The hearing.officer shall control the taking of
evidence in. a manner best. determined to be best
suited to ascertain the.facts and safeguard the rights
of the parties. The, hearing officer shall explain the
issues and the/ order in which evidence will be received.
c (9) A i party has the burden of proving, by a preponderance _ of u the., evidence whatever, facts in must
establish to, sustain its position. A provider always
has the burden of proof to show that services were,
in fact, rendered as billed.
so (10) Jhe burden of proof as to a particular > fact Is
on the party against .whom a finding on that fact
would be required in the absence of further evidence.
g. Ex Parte Communications
(1), Except as otherwise provided below, ex parte
communications are prohibited. t
',
v ,
(2) The hearing officer shall decline to listen to or
accept any communication offered in violation of
this rule and shall explain to the oTferor that any
communication received off the record and in violation of this rule must be made a part of the record
and furnished to all parties.
(3) This rule shall ^OT apply to.
, (a)-The disposition' of ex parte matters authorized
by law;'or1
t (b), Communications ^ concerning "status of the
hearing and uncontested procedural matters.
h. Continuances or Further Hearings
'/(\i{ The hearing. Officer may continue" a formal
Waring to''another* time or place, or order a further
hearing on his/her own motion or upon the showing
of good cause, at the request of any party.
f wn t
(2) ' Where \ the " hearing officer determines (hat
Cm>u«Co
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additional evidence is necessary for the proper determination of the case,»he/she may at his/her discretion:
i (a) Continue'the hearing to a later date and order
the party to produce additional evidence; or
., (b) Close the hearing-and hold the record open- in
order to permit the introduction * of additional documentary evidence. Any evidence so submitted shall be
made available' to both parties and each party»shall
have the opportunity for rebuttal.
(3) Written notice of the time and place of a continued or further hearing shall be given in accordance
with Section lO.b, except that when a continuance is
ordered during a hearing and adequate oral notice is
given.
i. Record
A complete Vecord of all formal'hearings shall fje
made. The testimony shall be electronically recorded
and/or memorialized by court reporter. The recording and/or memorialization shall be transcribed if
requested by' a party to the hearing. The requesting
party shall pay the costs of transcription and for
copying costs. At the conclusion of the formal
hearing, the complete record of the hearing will be
maintained in a secured area and shall be considered
the sole property of DHCF. DHCF or its designated
a g e n t will retain e l e c t r o n i c r e c o r d i n g s /
memorialization of formal hearings Tor a perjod of
one (1) year. Written records and documents will be
retained for a period not to exceed three (3) years.
j . Proposed Decision and Final Agency Review
(1) At the conclusion of the formal hearing! the
hearing officer shall take the, matter, under advisement and shall submit to the Executive Director of
DOH a proposed decision, based on the evidence and
testimony introduced at the hearing. '
,JI{
(2) The proposed decision shall be in writing and
shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(3) The Executive Director of DOH may;
.,
1>
(a) adopt the proposed decision, or any portion qf
the decision. f
,
t
(b) reject' the proposed decision, or any portion
thereof, and make his own independent determination based upon the record.
» '* H
f
(c) remand the matter to the hearing officer to take
additional evidence; and the hearing officer thereafter shall submit to the Executive Director of POH a
new proposed decision.
^
)t ,
(4) Review by the Executive Director constitutes
agency review and final administration action, and is
subject to judicial review in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Subsection 10.1.
(5) The aggrieved person or his/her representative
shall be notified of the final' administrative action
and the aggrieved person's right to judicial review of
the action.
t% /
(6) When the final administrative action is favorable to the aggrieved person, DHCF shall promptly
take corrective action.
(7) Subject to provisions for safeguarding "confide
ential information, all hearing decisions shall be kept
on file for public inspection.
k. Agency Review '
-,•>
»j
!
Reconsideration. Section 63-46b-13 Utah ' Code
Ann. 1953, as amended, is hereby incorporated by
reference.
, ; I. Judicial Review
(1) Judicial review of a final agency action "may be
secured by the aggrieved party by filing a petition in
the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days
after issuance of the Executive Director's final
administrative action. The petition shall be served

_ _ _
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upon the Executive Director and shall state the
grounds upon which review is sought. The Executive
Director shall file with his/her Answer certified
documents, papers, transcripts of all testimony taken
in the matter, recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the hearing officer and the
final administrative action of the Executive Director.
-'t(2) Judicial review of final administrative action is
governed by Section 63-46b-16 and Section 6346b-l, et seq. U. C. A. (1987), and Section 78-2a3,U.CA.(1953);
R455-14-2. Discovery
A. DISCOVERY PROVISIONS
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable
to these proceedings and no formal discovery except
as set forth hereinafter shall be permitted. Unless
otherwise limited by order of the hearing officer, the
scope of discovery 'in formal adjudicative proceedings
shall be as follows: ,
,
1. Review of Applicant/Recipient and Provider
Records
a. DHCF shall be permitted to review all records
which are pertinent to the hearing which are in the
custody or control of the applicant or recipient and
their health care providers. DHCF shall give at least
three (3) days' written notice the custodian of such
document(s).
b, DHCF shall be allowed to inspect a provider's
records which are pertinent to the hearing. Inspection
shall be made at the provider's business office during
regular working hours and after at least three (3)
days written notice.
2. Review of DHCF Records and Files
a. Before the Formal Hearing
Upon prior written request, the aggrieved person
or his/her representative will be permitted to
examine all documents and records to be used by the
State at the formal hearing, not later than three (3)
days before the formal hearing.'The aggrieved party
may request the Medicaid Management Information
System (MMIS) claim file. This will be available for
review fifteen (15) calendar days after DHCF receives
a written request for the information.
b. At the Formal Hearing
The aggrieved person or his/her representative
will be given an opportunity to:
' (!) Examine the aggrieved person's case file and
all documents and. records to be used by DHCF at
the hearing;
(2) Bring witnesses to the hearing; and
(3) Establish all pertinent facts and circumstances.
3. Pre-hcaring Procedure
a. The hearing officer may elect to hold a1 prehearing meeting for any of the following reasons:
' (1) to formulate or simplify trie issues;
(2) to obtain admissions of fact and documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(3) to arrange for the exchange of proposed exhibits or prepared expert testimony;
(4) to outline procedures to be followed,, at the
formal hearing; or
(5) to agree to such other matters as may expedite
the orderly conduct of the hearing or the settlement
thereof.,
'Agreements reached during the conference shall be
recorded or the parties may enter into a written stipulation or agree to a.statement made on,the,record
by the hearing officer,^
4. Interrogatories,, Depositions, and .Requests for
Admissions
a., The, hearing officer, may order the' taking of
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interrogatories and depositions, and c set 'appropriate
time-frames, assess sanctions for non-compliance,
and assess the expense to the requesting1 party if * the
hearing officer deems it proper.
*' b. The «hearing officer may* permit the 1filing> of
Requests for Admission,!" set appropriate'4 timeframes for responses, and assess sanctions'fori1 nom
compliance.
' 5. Medical Examination
a. The hearing officer may order'at DHCF-expense
a medical assessment in order to obtain information
necessary for a fair decision. This information
subject to confidentiality requirements shall be* made
a part of the formal hearing record.
1
' 6. Witnesses and Subpoenas
• a. A party shall arrange for the presence' of |iis
witnesses at the hearing.
b. A subpoena to compel the "attendance ~ of J a
witness or the* production of evidence'may' be issued
by the hearing officer, upon written' request by a
party and a sufficient showing of need,
c. A subpoena may also be issued by the hearing
officer on hrs own motion *u
d. An application for subpoena duces tecum'' for
the production by a witness of' books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records shall be
made by affidavit to the hearing officer. 1 The > application must include:
1
(1) The name and address of the person or.'entity
upon whom the subpoena is to be served;
(2) A description of the documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters* photographs,1 objects,"or' tangible
things not privileged, that which the applicant seeks; • >';
(3) A showing of the materiality* to>» the issue, involved in the hearing; and
> (4) A statement by the applicant that to the best' of
his knowledge the witness has. such items in his pos*
session or under his control.
e. The applicant shall arrange "to have all* subpoenas served which the hearing officer issues to him.
A copy of the affidavit presented to the* hearing
officer shall be served with the subpoena.
f. Except for employees of DOH, witnesses sunpoenaed for any hearing are entitled to appropriate
fees and mileage. The witness^ shalF file a written
demand for the fees with the hearing officer not later
than ten (10) days after the date the witness appeared
at the hearing.
7. Sanction by Hearing Officer
fa. The hearing officer may t sanction* or> penalize
any party that fails'to obey an r order entered by the
hearing officer.
R455-14-3. Declaratory Orders
As required by Section 63-46b-21,/ U / .C* A.
(1987), this rule provides for procedures ',for requesting of DOH through DHCF, for the issuance^ Of a
declaratory order determining the applicability of a
statute, rule, or order to specified circumstances^ w ^r \
1
A. DEFINITIONS For purposes of these provisions:
1. "Agency" means the Division of "Health Care
Financing, Utah Department of.Healtlj.
2. "Applicability* means a determination "of
whether a statute, rule, or order should be applied,
and if so, how the law as stated, should, be. applied to
specific facts and circumstances,
, 3. "Declaratory Ruling" means' an^administrative
interpretation or explanation of rights," status, and or
other legal relations under a. specific statute,' rule, or
order.
4. 'Order* means an agency, action pf particular
C<MM'»Co

